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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EX-
PRESS COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION and THE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
8659 
Respondent agrees substantially with the statement of 
facts as they appear on pages 3 and 4 of appellant's brief. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH SALES TAX ACT SUBJECTS TO 
TAXATION ALL SALES OF MOTOR VE-
HICLES. 
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POINT II. 
SEMI-TRAILERS ARE MOTOR VEHICLES 
WITHIN THE SALES TAX ACT. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
THE ACTION SINCE IT HAD NO JURISDIC-
TION TO HEAR THIS CASE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH SALES TAX ACT SUBJECTS TO 
TAXATION ALL SALES OF MOTOR VE-
HICLES. 
The arguments in points 1 and 4 of appellant's brief 
seem to center around the following statutory language 
contained in 59-15-2(e), U. C. A. 1953, as amended: 
"But the term 'retail sales' is not intended to 
include isolated nor occasional sales by persons not 
regularly engaged in business * * *, provided 
however, that no sale of a motor vehicle shall be 
deemed isolated or occasional for the purposes of 
this act." 
It would seem that there are three possible alternatives 
as to the meaning of this statutory language. They are: 
( 1) that it was meant to tax sales of motor vehicles only 
by retailers regularly engaged in the business of selling 
motor vehicles; (2) that it was meant to tax sales of motor 
vehicles by all retailers and retailers only; or (3) that it 
I 
~ .• :., ~ Jnc ..-
l~v:erei 
>T~.d :t~ 
Tru 
~~ 
(hiTt.: 
mio.'€i: 
.......... 
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was meant to impose a tax on the sale of all motor vehicles 
within this state. 
The first alternative can be immediately ruled out. If 
such were the case, the language would add nothing to the 
Sales Tax Act, as Sec. 59-15-4, U. C. A. 1953, already levies 
a tax upon "every retail sale of tangible personal property 
made within the state of Utah." If the wording in question 
were to be so construed, one of these sections would mean 
nothing. This court has held several times that proper 
statutory construction requires that significance be ac-
corded every part of a statute. Glenn v. Ferrell, 5 Ut. 2d 
439, 304 P. 2d 380; Dunn v. Bryan, 77 Ut. 604, 299 Pac. 253. 
The second alternative is the one which appellant ap-
parently urges the court to adopt. It argues that the Sales 
Tax Act is completely restricted to sales by retailers; that 
therefore the exemption as to isolated or occasional sales also 
applies only to retailers; and that the language excluding 
motor vehicles from the classification of isolated or occa-
sional sales is intended to require a tax on all sales of motor 
vehicles by retailers. Such an interpretation would require 
a tax on sales of motor vehicles by all regular retailers no 
matter what line of goods the retailer happened ordinarily 
to sell. Under this construction, a tax would be required 
on the sale of a car by a grocer or a service station operator, 
but not on the sale of a car by a barber or a doctor. It is 
immediately apparent that such a construction would raise 
grave doubts as to the constitutionality of the statute. As 
appellant ably stresses under Point 4 of its brief, such a 
classification would be unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive 
and discriminatory and the distinction would rest on no 
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reasonable basis. It seems odd that appellant would urge 
the court to adopt a construction which it admits is uncon-
stitutional, in light of the well recognized and universal 
rule that where two meanings may fairly be given an act, 
one rendering it in harmony, and the other in conflict with 
the constitution, the former must always prevail. State 
Water Pollution Board v. Salt Lake City, ... Ut. 2d ... , 
311 P. 2d 370; Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Ut. 2d 191, 291 P. 
2d 400; Logan City v. Public Utilities Comm., 72 Ut. 536, 
271 P. 961; Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Ut. 170, 
97 P. 2d 937; State v. Packard, 122 Ut. 369, 250 P. 2d 561. 
The final alternative, i. e. that all sales of motor ve-
hicles are subject to the sales tax, is the one which the Tax 
Commission asserted and the one which the trial court 
adopted. This interpretation gives effect to all parts of the 
Sales Tax Act and is in accord with the obvious intention 
of the legislature (See argument under Point II). No doubts 
could be raised as to its constitutionality as the act would 
apply to everyone equally. This interpretation is in full 
accord with the following statement of tnis court in the case 
of Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Ut. 170, 97 P. 2d 
937: 
"Moreover, in seeking to give effect to the in-
tent of the legislature the court will adopt that in-
terpretation of a taxing statute which lays the tax 
burden uniformly on all standing in the same degree 
with relation to the tax adopted * * * And will 
avoid an interpretation which would lead to an im-
practical, unfair, or unreasonable result." 
Such interpretation is also supported by the ordinary 
rules of statutory construction. Sec. 59-15-4, U. C. A. 1953, 
r .: 
i:i! 
[: 
:::.j~ ~~ 
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imposes a broad and general tax on sales by retailers. How-
ever, the legislature did not stop at this point, but more 
specifically provided that "no sale of a motor vehicle shall 
be deemed isolated or occasional for the purposes of this 
act." It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that 
specific statutory provisions will prevail over broad general 
provisions. Nelden v. Clark, 20 Ut. 382, 59 P. 524; Univer-
sity of Utah v. Richards, 20 Ut. 457, 59 P. 96. 
As further support for the trial court's holding that all 
sales of motor vehicles are subject to the sales tax, we refer 
to Sec. 59-15-5, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, which deals with 
the collection of the tax. This section was amended in 1949 
by the same act which amended Sec. 59-15-2(e) to exclude 
motor vehicles from the category of isolated or occasional 
sales (see Chapter 83, Laws of 1949). Therefore, the two 
provisions may be considered in pari materia. See Weber 
v. Pinyan, (Cal.) 61 P. 2d 954. The 1949 amendment to 
Sec. 59-15-5 states as follows: 
"* * * Provided, however, that on all mo-
tor vehicle sales made by other than a regular li-
censed dealer the tax shall be paid by the purchaser 
directly to the State Tax Commission upon every 
sale of a motor vehicle subject to registration and 
licensing under the laws of this state, and shall be 
collected by the State Tax Commission at the time 
of such registration and licensing." 
If the tax was not meant to apply to every sale of a 
motor vehicle there would be no need to require direct pay-
ment to the State Tax Commission, as all regular retailers 
are already collecting agents for the state. When this 
amendment is considered together with Sec. 59-15-2 (e), 
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U. C. A. 1953, as amended, it appears that the legislature 
clearly intended that no sale of a motor vehicle, whether 
made by a retailer or any other person, should be exempt 
from the sales tax. 
POINT II. 
SEMI-TRAILERS ARE MOTOR VEHICLES 
WITHIN THE SALES TAX ACT. 
Since the sales tax act provides that "no sale of a mo-
tor vehicle shall be deemed isolated or occasional for the 
purposes of this act" (59-15-2 (e) U. C. A. 1953, as 
amended) it becomes necessary to define the term "motor 
vehicle." As pointed out by the appellant this term is no-
where defined in the Sales Tax Act. Appellant would have 
.. ~r 
; -
I ll ·.; 
' ~:J!r­·~ 
the court apply the definition of motor vehicle as contained · · 
in the Motor Vehicle Act of this state. However, this act ~:~..:-:: 
bears little relationship to the Sales Tax Act and should 
not be controlling in defining the term as it is there em-
ployed. (See Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. South Carolina Elec-
tric & Gas Co., 75 S. E. 2d 688, S. C. 1953, where it was 
held that the definition of motor vehicle in an unrelated 
statute had no application.) 
In interpreting a statute, the primary obligation of the 
court is to give effect to the intention of the legislature. 
Norville v. State Tax Co'mmission, 98 Ut. 170, 97 P. 2d 937; 
West Beverage Co. v. Hansen, 98 Ut. 332, 96 P. 2d 1105; 
Utah Light & Traction Co. v. State Tax Commission, 92 Ut. 
404, 68 P. 2d 759. As stated in the Norville case, supra: 
"In the exposition of a statute the intention of 
the lawmaker will prevail over the literal sense of 
.,.,. .. ~. 
.... _ -~ 
i~ms: 
~~~ 
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the terms ; and its reason and intention will prevail 
over the strict letter. When the words are not ex-
plicit the intention is to be collected from the con-
text; from the occasion and necessity of the law; 
from the mischief felt, and the remedy in view; and 
this intention is to be taken or presumed according 
to what is consonant with reason and good discre-
tion." 
It is the contention of respondent that the obvious 
legislative intent was to tax vehicles of the type 
required to be licensed and registered in this state. Such 
category would include semi-trailers, as 41-1-19, U. C. A. 
1953, as amended, specifically requires them to be regis-
tered. 
When the Utah Legislature decided to create a sales 
tax, it was necessary to do so in a practical manner. The 
Legislature, therefore, laid down a general policy of taxing 
only those sales by regular retailers, and exempted isolated 
and occasional sales. The reason for this exemption was 
plainly because of the collection problem. It would be grossly 
impractical, if not absolutely impossible, to tax isolated 
and occasonal sales by persons not regularly engaged in 
business; the Tax Commission would have no way of find-
ing out about such sales, nor could there be any economical 
method of collecting sales tax. The Sales Tax Act, there-
fore, was primarily made to apply only to sales by retailers 
from their inventories of goods held for resale. The re-
tailer is made the collector for the Tax Commission, and in 
this manner the act is efficiently administered. 
The same considerations, however, do not apply to 
sales of vehicles which are subject to the registration laws 
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of the state of Utah. Here there exists a practical and 
efficient method for collecting sales tax, even though the 
vehicle is not sold by a regular retailer. Since it is neces-
sary for the owner to register the vehicle, it is both prac-
tical and convenient to collect the tax at that time. 
Further considerations also make it apparent that the 
legislature intended to impose the tax upon all vehicles 
subject to registration. On August 25, 1950, pursuant to 
Section 59-15-20, U. C. A. 1953, which confers upon the 
State Tax Commission the authority to administer the Sales 
Tax Act, the commission promulgated and published a reg-
ulation which reads as follows: 
"No sale of a vehicle subject to the registration 
laws of this state shall be deemed an isolated or 
occasional sale." (See Sales Tax Regulation 38.) 
Respondent recognizes that no administrative body can by 
regulation supersede the will of the legislature. However, 
since this regulation was promulgated, the legislature of 
this state has had occasion to meet four times not counting 
special sessions. In spite of the fact that the legislature has 
had the Sales Tax Act brought to its attention and amended 
it in various places, no change has been made in the lan-
guage interpreted by this regulation. It is submitted that 
where a law which is susceptible of interpretation has been 
given a particular construction by administrative regulation, 
and the legislature has allowed the same to stand for a 
period of time, it is entitled to great respect as being a true 
expression of the legislative purpose. State v. Alta Club, 120 
Ut. 121, 232 P. 2d 759; Olsen v. State Tax Commission, 
t 
(: 
, .•. ·. 
.. ~:-: ; 
:...:..: 
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109 Ut. 563, 168 P. 2d 324; Utah Power & Light v. Public 
Service Commission, 107 Ut. 155, 152 P. 2d 542; In re 
Cowan's Estate, 98 Ut. 393, 99 P. 2d 605; Decker v. New 
York Life Ins. Co., 94 Ut. 166, 76 P. 2d 568; Murdock v. 
Mabey, 59 Ut. 346, 203 P. 651; State Board of Land Com'rs 
v. Ririe, 56 Ut. 213, 190 P. 59. 
Also the Sales Tax Act itself refers in several places 
to vehicles subject to registration. Section 59-15-5 (U. C. 
A. 1953, as amended), which deals with the collection of 
the tax, states as follows: 
"However, that on all motor vehicle sales made 
by other than a regular licensed dealer the tax shall 
be paid by the purchaser directly to the State Tax 
Commission upon every sale of a motor vehicle sub-
ject to registration and licensing, under the laws of 
this state, and shall be collected by the State Tax 
Commission at the time of such registration and 
licensing." (Emphasis added.) 
As recently as 1957 the legislature has dealt with the 
Sales Tax Act. At 59-15-6, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, it 
exempted from sales tax certain vehicles purchased in Utah 
by nonresidents for use outside the state. This exemption 
applied to "all sales of vehicles of a type required to be regis-
tered under the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Laws of this 
state." This is but another indication that the legislature 
originally intended the sales tax to apply to "vehicles of 
the type required to be registered" and the term motor ve-
hicles should be so construed. 
All of the foregoing considerations clearly show that 
the term "motor vehicle" as used in the Utah Sales Tax Act 
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was meant to include all vehicles subject to registration in 
this State. 
Even if the court should find that the Sales Tax Act 
was not necessarily intended to tax all vehicles subject to 
registration, still we submit that a semi-trailer is a "motor 
vehicle" within the contemplation of the Sales Tax Act. The 
semi-trailer is merely a part of the truck or unit. This unit 
would consist of a tractor and one or more trailers or semi-
trailers. All are combined together to form the motor ve-
hicle. The fallacy of appellant's argument becomes appar-
ent when carried to its logical conclusion. They could just 
as reasonably argue that a spare tire, or the motor, or the 
body, or any other part of the truck is not in and of itself 
a "motor vehicle" and we would have to agree. However, 
when all these component parts are put together, the pro-
duct clearly becomes a motor vehicle under any definition. 
It would seem that the back end is just as much a part of 
the truck as the front end. 
Contrary to the statement made on page 16 of appel-
lant's brief, many cases involving a variety of fact situa-
tions have held that semi-trailers or trailers are motor ve-
hicles. 
The case of State v. Schwartzman Service, Inc., 40 S. 
W. 2d 479 (Mo. 1931) involved a conviction for the opera-
tion of a "motor vehicle" having excess gross weight. The 
court in stating that the intention of the legislature should 
prevail over the literal sense of terms, held that a semi-
trailer was a motor vehicle. See also Eddleman v. City of 
Brazil, 166 N. W. 1 (Ind. 1929), which held to the same 
effect. 
-r-r 
:...--
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In Department of Motor Transportation v. Trailer Con-
voys, Inc., 279 S. W. 2d 815 (Ky. 1955) it was held that 
semi-trailers were "motor vehicles" within a statute giving 
tax advantages to transportation of new motor vehicles, 
notwithstanding that trailers were not self propelled. 
In Prudential Insurance Co. of Great Britain v. As-
sociated Employers, Lloyds, 250 S. W. 2d 477 (Texas 1952) 
the court was called upon to construe an insurance policy 
which insured only accidents involving two or more motor 
vehicles. In an accident where a truck and semi-trailer 
overturned, it was held that the accident did not involve two 
motor vehicles, however, it was noted by the court that a 
trailer pulled by a motor vehicle may become part of said 
motor vehicle in spite of the fact that no statute provides 
that a trailer is a motor vehicle. 
In Fruehauf Trailer Company v. South Carolina Elec-
tric & Gas Co., 75 S. E. 2d 688 (S. C. 1953) a trailer was 
held to be a "motor vehicle" under a statute providing for 
a lien on motor vehicles in favor of one injured or damaged 
through negligence or reckless operation thereof. 
In Vest v. Kramer, 106 N. E. 2d 105 (Ohio 1955) it 
was held that a two-wheeled utility trailer designed for and 
employed in general highway transportation and attached 
to and operated as a unit with an automobile, which pro-
vides the motive power for the unit, is a motor vehicle within 
the Ohio statute. 
And in Grendreau v. State Farm Fire Insurance Co. of 
Bloomington, 288 N. W. 225 (Minn. 1939) an automobile 
trailer was held to be a "motor vehicle" under a statute 
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12 
dealing with insurance on "automobiles, motorcycles and 
other motor vehicles." 
Even though the Motor Vehicle Act in Utah appears 
to exclude trailers and semi-trailers from the definition of 
a motor vehicle, yet the same act for some purposes treats 
trailers and semi-trailers as a unit with the tractor which 
pulls it, which clearly falls within the definition of a "mo-
tor vehicle." See, for example, Sec. 41-1-88, U. C. A. 1953, 
as amended which provides as follows: 
"* * * provided that no such fee or any 
other registration fee shall be required with respect 
to any semi-trailer or trailer registered outside the 
state where it is shown to the satisfaction of the 
state tax commission that such semi-trailer or trailer 
is being pulled by a tractor * * * whick is reg-
istered within the state of Utah in conjunction with 
a semi-trailer or trailer likewise registered within 
the state of Utah." (Emphasis added.) 
It therefore appears that the Sales Tax Act when con-
sidered in its entirety clearly manifests the intention of the 
legislature that semi-trailers and all other vehicles of a type 
subject to the registration and licensing provisions of the 
Utah law are to be classified as motor vehicles within the 
meaning of the Sales Tax Act. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
THE ACTION SINCE IT HAD NO JURISDIC-
TION TO HEAR THIS CASE. 
The legislature in adopting the Sales Tax Act set up 
an administrative procedure by which unsatisfied taxpay-
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ers could object to tax assessments made by the commission. 
The applicable statutory provisions which set up this pro-
cedure are as follows : 
59-15-12. Objection to Assessment - Petition -
Hearing.-
"If any person having made a return and paid the 
tax provided by this act, feels aggrieved by the as-
sessment made upon him by the tax commission, he 
may apply to the tax commission by a petition in 
writing within 10 days after the notice is mailed to 
him for a hearing and a correction of the amount of 
tax so assessed, in which petition he shall set forth 
the reasons why such hearing should be granted and 
the amount by which such tax should be reduced. 
The tax commission shall notify the petitioner of 
the time and place fixed by it for such hearing. 
After such hearing, the tax commission may make 
such order in the matter as may appear to it just 
and lawful and shall furnish a copy of such order 
to the petitioner." 
59-15-13. Decision of Commission, When Final.-
"Every decision of the Tax Commission shall be in 
writing and notice thereof shall be made to the ven-
dor within ten days, and all such decisions shall be-
come final upon the expiration of 30 days after 
notice of such decision shall have been mailed to the 
vendor, unless proceedings are taken within said 
time for review by the Supreme Court upon writ 
of certiorari as herein provided, in which case it 
shall become final, (1) when affirmed or modified 
by the judgment of the supreme court; (2) if the 
Supreme Court remands the case to the tax commis-
sion for rehearing, when it is thereafter determined 
as hereinabove provided with respect to the initial 
proceeding." 
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59-15-14. Review by Supreme Court. -
"Within 30 days after notice of any decision of the 
tax commission, any party affected thereby may 
apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari 
for review for the purpose of having the unlawful-
ness of such decision inquired into and determined. 
Such writ shall be made returnable not later than 
thirty days after the date of the issuance thereof, 
and shall direct the tax commission to certify its 
records, which shall include all the proceedings and 
the evidence taken in the case to the court. Upon 
the hearing, no new or additional evidence may be 
introduced, but the case shall be heard on the record 
before the tax commission as certified to by it. The 
decision of the tax commission may be reviewed both 
upon the law and fact and the provisions of the code 
of civil procedure of this state relating to appeals so 
far as applicable and not in conflict with this act 
apply to the proceedings in the Supreme Court under 
the provisions of this section." 
59-15-15. Exclusive Jurisdiction of Supreme Court. 
"No court of this state, except the Supreme Court, 
shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, or annul 
any decision of the tax commission or to suspend or 
delay the operation or execution thereof; provided, 
that a writ of mandamus shall lie from the Supreme 
Court in all proper cases." 
The taxpayer in the instant case, ignoring the above 
provisions, simply paid the tax under protest then brought 
an action for recovery in the district court. Never at any 
time did it apply to the tax commission for a hearing of 
this matter. 
Apparently appellant justifies its manner of procedure 
by Section 59-11-11, U. C. A. 1953, which provides as fol-
lows: 
"In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses or other 
demands for public revenue which is deemed unlaw-
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ful by the party whose property is thus taxed, or 
from whom such tax or license is demanded or en-
forced, such party may pay under protest such tax 
or license, or any part thereof deemed unlawful, to 
the officers designated and authorized by law to 
collect the same ; and thereupon the party so paying 
or his legal representative may bring an action in 
any court of competent jurisdiction against the offi-
cer to whom said tax or license was paid, or against 
the state, county, municipality or other taxing unit 
on whose behalf the same was collected, to recover 
said tax or license or any portion thereof paid under 
protest." 
It should be pointed out that Sec. 59-11-11, U. C. A. 
1953 is not part of the Sales Tax Act. On the contrary, it 
was adopted long before the sales tax ever came into ex-
istence. Chapters 1 to 10 of Title 59, U. C. A. 1953, deal 
with the property tax. Chapter 11 of Title 59, U. C. A. 
1953, is entitled "Miscellaneous Provisions," and it directly 
follows the property tax provisions. An analysis of many 
of the other sections in this miscellaneous chapter reveals 
that they apply only to the property tax. Admittedly the 
procedure outlined in Section 59-11-11, U. C. A. 1953 has 
been followed with respect to some taxes other than the 
property tax, but no instance has been found where it has 
ever been applied to the sales tax. 
In the case of State Tax Commission v. Katsis, 90 Ut. 
406, 62 P. 2d 120, the Tax Commission, proceeding under 
what is now Section 59-15-11, U. C. A. 1953, brought an 
action in the district court to recover unpaid delinquent sales 
tax. After the action was commenced, Katsis questioned 
the validity of the assessment. In noting that he had never 
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applied to the commission for hearing or a correction the 
court stated: 
"If a person assessed fails to apply for a hearing 
and correction within ten days, he has barred him-
self from further review of the commission's assess-
ment, and he cannot open up the question of proper 
amount or validity of the assessment when the pro-
cesses of the court are used by the commission to 
obtain a judicial declaration of indebtedness." 
Although the outcome of the case turned on other grounds, 
the above-quoted language would seem to imply that a tax 
assessment must stand unless attacked in the proper stat-
utory manner. 
The Katsis case was cited with approval in State Tax 
Commission v. Spanish Fork, 99 Ut. 177, 100 P. 2d 575, 
where the Supreme Court in speaking about the sales tax 
stated: 
"There are administrative provisions for a hear-
ing and for a determination of the justness of this 
claim which may be invoked by the taxpayer, who 
may also bring certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
* * * Only by invoking the above mentioned 
administrative procedure may the tax debtor ques-
tion the tax or deficiency as assessed. He cannot 
collaterally attack the tax or deficiency so found, 
except in limited respects * * * He cannot sit 
by and wait for the tax commission to sue him and 
then raise all the questions which he might have 
raised if he had taken advantage of his rights under 
the law. He must exhaust his administrative rem-
edies." (Emphasis added.) 
In 1937, at the first session of the legislature subse-
quent to the decision in the Katsis Case, the legislature 
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amended Sec. 59-15-11 to its current form, which greatly 
facilitates the collection remedies of the Tax Commission. 
At the same session the legislature enaced the Use Tax 
Act, which is the correlative of the Sales Tax Act, the 
former applying only to sales of tangible personal property 
made outside the state where the goods were purchased for 
use in Utah. As part of the Use Tax Act the legislature 
provided in Sec. 59-16-23, Utah Code Annotated 1953, that 
the person paying the tax may pay under protest and sue 
in court to recover. However, the legislature added some 
limitations which are peculiar to the Use Tax Act, e. g. that 
only the courts of Salt Lake County should have jurisdic-
tion, and that the period of limitation of actions should be 
six months. In spite of the fact that the Sales and Use Tax 
Act are closely associated in purpose, and that the legisla-
ture passed an amendment to the Sales Tax Act at the same 
time it enacted the Use Tax Act, no ·provision for payment 
under protest and suit to recover was then or later included 
in the Sales Tax Act, while such a provision was included in 
the Use Tax Act. 
Similar provisions for payment under protest with 
suit to recover are found in connection with other taxes. 
For example, with relation to the Mine Occupation Tax the 
legislature set up an administrative procedure very similar 
to that provided in the Sales Tax Act (See 59-5-74 to 77, 
U. C. A. 1953). However, in the Mine Occupation Tax the 
legislature after vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Su-
preme Court to review decisions of the tax commission 
further provided in Section 59-5-77, U. C. A. 1953: 
"Any taxpayer may pay his occupation tax 
under protest and thereafter bring an action in any 
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court of competent jurisdiction for the return 
thereof as provided by 59-11-11, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953." 
Some taxes, such as the franchise and privilege taxes 
levied against corporations have provisions similar to those 
contained in the Sales Tax Act, giving exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the Supreme Court to review the decisions of the 
Tax Commission. Other taxes, such as the individual in-
come tax, tobacco and oleomargarine taxes, motor fuels tax, 
etc. make no mention at all of any procedure to review a 
tax commission determination. It is submitted that Sec. 
59-11-11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, was meant to provide 
relief only where the legislature did not set out any specific 
procedure to be followed, but that it would not apply where 
the legislature as in the Sales Tax Act has specifically pro-
vided for an exclusive method of review. Particularly is 
this the case where the latter enactment is the later expres-
sion of the legislative will. Becker Products Co. v. State 
Tax Commission, 89 Ut. 587, 58 P. 2d 36; Nelden v. Clark, 
20 Ut. 382, 59 P. 524. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's dis-
missal of plaintiff's complaint should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
BEN E. RAWLINGS, 
JOHN G. MARSHALL, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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